Corps d'armee
Semi-independent all-arms bodies -- Napoleon's organisational signature.
Grande Armee, British sea power, and coalition armies -- historical structures.
Educational history. Casualty figures are documented ranges. This is not operational advice, a ranking of nations, or a how-to for weapons or coups.
French corps organisation and conscription were the institutional revolution. Coalition armies learned to concentrate in 1813 after years of being beaten in detail.
The Royal Navy's blockade was a force structure: ships of the line, dockyards, and press gangs -- a British state more than a battle.
Semi-independent all-arms bodies -- Napoleon's organisational signature.
Taxes, debt, and dockyards as a way of making war without a Grande Armee.
Improving from 1805 to 1813-15 -- Trachenberg plan as political-military coordination.
Popular war that regulars could not map away.
Economic warfare as occupation policy.
Vienna as a standing method, not a single party.
Austerlitz, Jena, Wagram, Leipzig -- the imperial chessboard.
Invasion threat and its naval end.
The ulcer: sieges, lines, guerrillas.
Kovno to Moscow and back -- distance as a weapon.
Waterloo and Wavre as a two-battlefield day.
1812 consumed them; later campaigns felt the shortage.
Subsidies to Russia, Prussia and Austria.
Living off the country worked in Germany and failed in Russia's emptiness.
Ships of the line as industrial products of a pre-steam age.
Cavalry and artillery matter in the paintings; typhus and supply mattered more in Russia.
This is not a guide to employing horse artillery. It is a historical force picture.