Iraqi regular army
A Soviet-equipped force that opened the war and later grew into a mass conscript machine.
Iranian and Iraqi armies and the Gulf naval melee -- historical, not a manual.
Educational history. Casualty figures are documented ranges. This is not operational advice, a ranking of nations, or a how-to for weapons or coups.
Iraq began with more armour and air; Iran answered with numbers, revolutionary infantry, and later better combined operations. Both improvised under sanctions and suppliers' politics.
Naval and air attacks on tankers made the Gulf a third service's war.
A Soviet-equipped force that opened the war and later grew into a mass conscript machine.
A dual structure of regulars and revolutionary guards -- politically as important as tactically.
The war of the cities as a political system of fear.
Tanker protection as an international force layer after 1987.
Credits and parts as a coalition of invoices.
UNIIMOG observers after 598 -- a thin but real end-institution.
The first city war.
Iran's long bid that failed.
1986-88 peninsula hinge.
The internationalised front.
The named civilian crime site.
The prize and the target.
Southern geography as an obstacle and a weapon of terrain -- described, not instructed.
A war fought on other people's factories.
Recorded as crime, not as a recipe.
Force history here is organisational and political. It is not an employment guide for chemical or any other weapons.
Human-wave descriptions in Western press often erased Iranian learning after 1984 -- a bias to correct without denying the cost.