Alliance automaticity
Timetables and guarantees shortened the diplomatic hour in July 1914.
Western Front, other fronts and the 1918 offensives -- historical sequence, not instruction.
Educational history. Casualty figures are documented ranges. This is not operational advice, a ranking of nations, or a how-to for weapons or coups.
Darker cells mean a higher score for this topic on that metric.
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No. Scores are browsing aids inside an era-bounded atlas — not live league tables of countries.
About 15-22 million dead is the usual scholarly band, plus the 1918-19 influenza that killed tens of millions more worldwide, including many already weakened by the war. Military dead are better counted than civilians.
No single cause. Alliance commitments, militarism, imperial rivalry, the Balkan crises, and a July 1914 diplomatic failure all appear in standard accounts. Historians still argue about German war aims and shared responsibility.
That is where British, dominion and (from 1917) US armies fought longest. Poetry, photography and the density of cemeteries in France and Flanders created a portable memory. Other fronts were as deadly for those who fought there.
The 1919 treaty with Germany: territorial losses, disarmament clauses, Article 231 ("war guilt"), and reparations. It was one of several treaties. The US never ratified it.
They mattered increasingly in 1918, together with artillery-infantry methods and German economic collapse. They did not make 1916 "modern" in the later Second World War sense.
The Western Front's geography (coal, rail, Channel ports) locked both sides into a short, dense battlefield.
Gallipoli, the Isonzo, Palestine and East Africa had different climates and the same industrial logistics problem: how to supply a mass army far from home.
Teaching theater nodes — themes and logistics, not a ranking of nations or peoples.
Timetables and guarantees shortened the diplomatic hour in July 1914.
Until late methods caught up, attackers paid more -- a fact, not a slogan.
Blockade and finance were grand strategy, not side policy.
Foch's 1918 generalissimo role was political as much as operational.
The League without the US, and with revisionist powers, could not police the map it drew.
Sarajevo to Austrian ultimatum -- a Balkan war that could have stayed Balkan.
Hindsight is cheap; the files show how narrow the exits were.
Russian, German, French and Austrian mobilisations made reversal politically costly.
Mobilisation was not yet shooting, but it was nearly war.
The Marne and the failure to outflank through Flanders ended the 1914 script.
Plans are not destinies.
1915-17 offensives sought a break that geography and firepower denied.
Learning was real and expensive.
Italy (1915), US (1917), and Russia's exit (1918) reset the coalition maths.
Entry and exit both change strategy.
Civilian governments sought terms while armies were still in the field.
The clock on 11 November was a political instrument.
A simple who-declared-on-whom timeline -- more useful than a single "war guilt" arrow.
A static line with named salients, showing how little the map moved for three years.
Blockade deaths and Ottoman mass killings have wider error bands than British Army rolls.
English sources still under-describe 1914-17 in Poland and Galicia.
Trench and gas history is not instruction.
1918's combined-arms methods are described as history. They are not a field manual.
The "lions led by donkeys" slogan is a memory war, not a complete operational analysis.